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NOTES
ATTEMPTS TO SECURE STATE LEGISLATIVE RESTRAINTS
OF COMPETITION AS A VIOLATION OF
THE ANTITRUST LAWS
The typical antitrust suit involves a course of conduct consisting en-
tirely of actions of private individuals or business entities. The issues to be
litigated are the existence and significance of that conduct.' In a few
instances, however, antitrust suits have been instituted in which the alleged
illegal conduct involved the instigation of judicial,2 administrative,3 or
legislative 4 action. Almost invariably these suits are challenged on the
ground that private responsibility cannot be founded on the consequences
of official acts. In cases involving action by state legislative bodies, this
proposition has been accepted by some courts 5 while others regarded the
nature of the acts constituting the course of conduct as irrelevant.6 Behind
this divergence lies a basic problem not considered by the courts: the
extent to which inducement of legislative activity for the purpose of effec-
tuating a restraint of interstate commerce leads to a conflict between
two important functions of government.
The first of these functions of government is to reconcile group
interests,
1. "It is not of importance whether the means used to accomplish the unlawful ob-
jective are in themselves lawful or unlawful." American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946).
2. See, e.g., Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952); United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa.
1956).
3. See, e.g., Okefenokee Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Florida Power and
Light Co., 214 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines,
Inc, 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1952), appeal dismissed, 204 F.2d 230 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 806 (1953), 15 F.R.D. 175 (D.N.J. 1954); United States v. Asso-
ciation of Am. Railroads, 4 F.R.D. 510 (D. Neb. 1945).
4. See, e.g., Okefenokee Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Florida Power and
Light Co., 214 F2d 413 (5th Cir. 1954); Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference, 113 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Pa. 1953); United States
v. Association of Am. Railroads, 4 F.R.D. 510 (D. Neb. 1945); Carolene Products
Co. v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, In Equity No. 15573 (N.D. Ill. 1937), aff'd, 93 F2d
202 (7th Cir. 1938); Mills Novelty Co. v. National Dairy Products Corp., At Law
No. 44394 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd per curiam sub ntoi. Mills Novelty Co. v. International
Ass'n of Ice Cream Manufacturers, 87 F.2d 1012 (7th Cir. 1936). Cf. United States
v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (cases in which action was sought from a foreign govern-
nent).
5. Okefenokee Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Florida Power and Light
Co., supra note 4; Carolene Products Co. v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, supra note 4;
Mills Novelty Co. v. National Dairy Products Corp., supra note 4. Cf. American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., supra note 4.
6. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference, 113 F.
Supp. 737 (E.D. Pa. 1953); United States v. Association of Am. Railroads, 4 F.R.D.
510 (D. Neb. 1945). Cf. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
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"to devise policies that provide an accommodation among conflicting
drives, to maintain social unity despite the inevitable diversity of in-
terest of social groups and classes. Freedom of association and freedom
of expression of interest facilitate the resolution of conflict through
open discussion of divisive issues. . .. 7 The chief vehicles for the
expression of group interest are political parties and pressure
groups . . .8 Pressure groups fill a gap in our formal political
system by performing a function of representation beyond the capacities
of representatives chosen by the voters in geographical districts..
[T]heir representations to legislators constitute simply the normal
process of governance in a regime which proceeds through consultation
with those to be affected by legislation." 9
The second is regulation of individual and group conduct for the general
welfare. The antitrust laws are an instance of such regulation in the eco-
nomic sphere. They embody a judgment that the greatest social benefit
is to be derived from a competitive economy; 10 their scope indicates an
intent to reach all instances of conduct inimical to that policy which Con-
gress may constitutionally regulate." These functions of government con-
flict when individuals attempt to restrain competition by stimulating an
exercise of governmental power, in that the democratic process is used
to produce a result which Congress has declared undesirable. Therefore,
the applicability of antitrust sanctions to such conduct cannot be con-
sidered apart from the basic governmental processes involved.
THE SCOPE OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS IN THE CONTEXT OF PRIVATE
ACTION To INDUCE LEGISLATIVE RESTRAINTS OF TRADE
Where legislation affecting interstate commerce is sought from Con-
gress, it seems clear that private action to bring it about must be outside
the scope of the antitrust laws regardless of the motive for which it is
sought. These laws are themselves acts of Congress and if the govern-
mental process is to be responsive to the will of the people, individuals and
interest groups cannot be denied the right to urge legislation which would
modify or even repeal them.' 2  The Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts,'8
which modified antitrust policy in the area of resale price maintenance,
7. Kty, PoLITIcs, PARTIES, AND P,-ssuR GRouPs 174 (3d ed. 1952).
8. KEY, op. cit. supra note 7, at 24.
9. KEY, op. cit. supra note 7, at 152.
10. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 559 (1944);
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
11. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, supra note 10, at 558.
12. Cf. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 358 (1909).
"The fundamental reason why persuading a sovereign power to do this or that can-
not be a tort . . . is that it is a contradiction in terms to say that within its jurisdic-
tion it is unlawful to persuade a sovereign power to bring about a result that it de-
clares by its conduct to be desirable and proper."
13. Miller-Tydings Act 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952), amending
26 STAT. 209 (1890); Mcduire Act, 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (2) (1952),
amending 38 STAT. 719 (1914).
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were largely the result of activity by private interest groups seeking an end
which the antitrust laws prohibited.
1 4
A solution to the problem of inducement of state legislative restraints
of interstate commerce is less clear. A state may not regulate interstate
commerce directly since this power is reserved to Congress under the
Constitution.' 5  However, in the exercise of its police power to legislate
for the health, safety, morals and welfare of its people, a state may enact
legislation affecting interstate commerce 16 if the legislation does not "impede
substantially the free flow of commerce from state to state." "7 Without
constitutional tolerance of this indirect power over interstate commerce,
the police power would be substantially nullified.18 Thus, an exercise of
the police power is proper if it has, as at least one of its objectives, a con-
stitutionally proper subject of such legislation is sanctioned. In Stephenson
v. Binford,19 plaintiff challenged a state statute which regulated use of the
highways by trucks by effecting a redistribution of freight business between
trucks and the railroads. The Court stated:
"We need not consider whether the act in some other aspect
would be good or bad. It is enough to support its validity that,
plainly, one of its aims is to conserve the highways. If the Legislature
had other or additional purposes, which, considered apart, it had no
constitutional power to make effective, that would not have the result
of making the act invalid." 
2 0
In Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel,2 1 on the other hand, the
Court granted a temporary injunction restraining the enforcement of a
Louisiana conservation law which prohibited interstate shipment of un-
processed shrimp or their raw shells and heads upon a showing by plain-
tiffs that conservation was not the true purpose of the law.
"[T] he conservation of hulls and heads is a feigned and not the real
purpose. . . . [T]he purpose of the enactment is to prevent the
interstate movement of raw shrimp from the Louisiana Marshes . . .
[in order] to bring about the removal of the packing and canning in-
dustries from Mississippi to Louisiana. The conditions imposed by
the Act upon the interstate movement of the meat and other products
of shrimp are not intended, and do not operate, to conserve them for
the use of the people of the State." 1
14. KEY, op. cit. supra note 7, at 96; TRuMAN, TRn GOVRN mENTAL 'RoCFSs
80 (1951).
15. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
16. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 766-67 (1945) and cases cited.
17. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, supra note 16, at 767.
18. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177,
189 (1938).
19. 287 U.S. 251 (1932).
20. 287 U.S. at 276.
21. 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
22. 278 U.S. at 10.
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Here an exercise of the police power was invalidated because of the improper
objective motivating it. Normally, however, if police power legislation
lies within a traditional area it will withstand challenge on the ground
of conflict with the commerce clause. Since Fletcher v. Peck 2 the courts
have adhered to the doctrine, based on a theory of separation of powers,24
that the judiciary cannot inquire into the motives of the legislature in pass-
ing on the constitutionality of its enactments "except as [those motives]
may be disclosed on the face of the acts, or inferrible from their opera-
tion." 2 Because of the privilege accorded legislative bodies against
direct inquiry into their motives, a restraint of interstate commerce
in a police power area may be upheld when in reality the legislative intent
was solely to affect interstate commerce.20 This fact, and the fact that
much police power legislation enacted to accomplish a proper objective
may also affect interstate commerce, make lobbying for state legislation a
potential means for effectuating a restraint on trade.
It is clear that governmental action imposing restraints upon interstate
commerce is not within the purview of sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman
Act 2 7  That the legislative intent in the Sherman Act was to prevent
private not governmental, actions in restraint of competition 28 was recog-
nized by the Supreme Court in Olsen v. Smith.29 Plaintiffs, licensed under
a Texas statute prohibiting persons from acting as pilots unless authorized
by law, sued defendant unlicensed pilots for damages. In rejecting defend-
ants' contention that the statute violated the Sherman Act, the Court said:
"The contention that because the commissioned pilots have a
monopoly of the business, and by combination among themselves ex-
clude all others from rendering pilotage services, is also but a denial
of the authority of the State to regulate, since if the State has the
power to regulate, and in so doing to appoint and commission, those
who are to perform pilotage services, it must follow that no monopoly
or combination in a legal sense can arise from the fact that the duly
23. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
24. McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 53-59 (1904).
25. Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710 (1885). See also Daniel v. Family
Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S.
423, 455 n.7 (1931) ; cf. Sunbury & Erie R.R. v. Cooper, 33 Pa. 278 (1859).
26. Cf. Florida Central & Peninsular R.R. v. Reynolds, 183 U.S. 471, 480
(1902).
27. Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes "every contract, combination ...
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States ......
Section 2 makes illegal monopolization or attempts to monopolize "any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States .. " 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1952). Section 2 supplements § 1 so that "by no possible guise [can]
the public policy embodied in the first section be frustrated or evaded." Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). By its terms, violation of § 1 can
occur only where two or more individuals act in concert. Where individual activity
is referred to in this Note in connection with a § 1 violation, this prerequisite is
understood to have been met.
28. For a brief review of the legislative history, showing that prevention of pri-
vately-imposed restraints of competition was the problem considered, see Apex Hos-
iery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 n.15 (1940).
29. 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
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authorized agents of the State are alone allowed to perform the duties
devolving upon them by law." 3 0
Although governmental action itself may be immune from the antitrust
laws, logic does not compel the conclusion, where a state legislature is
involved, that private inducement of that action need also share the im-
munity.31 The susceptibility of state lobbying activity, to sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act depends, instead, on the intended scope of those sec-
tions on the one hand, and on limitations on congressional power on the
other. A number of the cases have recognized this distinction between
the validity of state legislation affecting interstate commerce via the police
power, and private activity directed toward the enactment of state legisla-
tion for the purpose of restraining competition.3 2 However, the opinions
are phrased in terms of a general proposition that "lawful means may not
be used to achieve an unlawful end," which is, in terms of the problem, an
oversimplification.
Legislative history does not indicate whether Congress specifically
considered private action to secure governmental restraints of competition, as
distinguished from the governmental action itself, to be outside the scope
of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. There is evidence, however, that
in enacting the Sherman Act, Congress intended to reach all subjects and
species of conduct within the breadth of its regulatory power under the
commerce clause.P The broad language of sections 1 and 2 can compre-
hend any private conduct whose purpose or effect is to restrain interstate
commerce unless that conduct is protected by a constitutional limitation on
congressional power or unless Congress itself has created an exemption.3 4
The only important doctrinal qualification to this proscription is the
judicially enunciated "rule of reason," which holds that only those re-
straints of trade which are unreasonable are illegal 3 5 Though this doctrine
may shield certain instances of lobbying activity from antitrust sanctions it
by no means immunizes all.36
30. 195 U.S. at 344-45. See also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943)
and cases cited.
31. An individual may be prosecuted under the Sherman Act even though his
improper conduct has been effectuated through an innocent third party. United States
v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 541 (1913) ; Johnson v. J.H. Yost Lumber Co., 117 F.2d 53,
61 (8th Cir. 1941).
32. See cases cited note 6 supra.
33. See note 11 supra.
34. Examples of such exemptions are those for export associations, state resale
price maintenance schemes, labor activities and agricultural cooperatives. For a brief
discussion, see REPORT OF THZ A ToRmoy GnNERAL'S NATIONAL Commirxa To STUDY
THP ANTITRusT LAws 109-10, 149-53, 294-300, 306-11 (1955) (hereinafter cited as
RxpoR).
35. See Rs'oRT at 5, 11.
36. The rule of reason requires a court to examine allegedly illegal conduct in
its economic context, including its purpose, operation and effect, so as to determine
whether the restraint is unreasonable under the circumstances. The doctrine is not
a bar to application of §§ 1, 2 of the Sherman Act to lobbying activity so long as the
reasonability of the restraint vis 6 vis the competitive position of the parties affected
is distinguished from the reasonability of the restraint from the legislative standpoint.
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Application of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act does not depend
upon the motive of the lobbyist in inducing legislative activity. Although
it is easier analytically to envisage a Sherman Act violation n terms of a
party whose motive is to weaken his rival's competitive position, a party
who urges legislation for reasons consistent with proper police power
objectives may be in no better position. If one of the foreseeable effects
of the enactment is the enhancement of his own competitive position at the
expense of his rival, he would seem to be equally within the Sherman Act
ban
3 7
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CONGRESSIONAL POWER
In determining the permissible scope of Sherman Act enforcement
in the area of private activity to induce legislative restraints of trade,
certain constitutional limitations on congressional power must be recog-
nized. The first is the nature of the federal system, which gives authority
to the states over matters concerning the health, safety, morals and wel-
fare of their people. The second is the first amendment of the Constitution,
which guarantees freedom of speech and the right to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances.
Limitation Imposed by the Nature of the Federal System
All powers not delegated to the national government are reserved to
the states under our federal system of government The operation of this
system presumes that each level of government will interfere as little as
possible in the legitimate sphere of operations of the other. However, there
is an inevitable coincidence of authority in some areas. A state "police
power" enactment, for example, may impinge upon interstate commerce.
Since such coincidence of authority is part of the federal system, it would
seem necessary, in the context of the present problem, to so interpret con-
gressional power and thus the Sherman Act that it does not unduly en-
croach upon the state legislative process. A necessary element of this
process is communication between the state legislature and the citizens of
the state. When a citizen who is motivated by an objective properly
the concern of the state urges police power legislation, his conduct must be
regarded as an integral part of the operation of the federal system and
therefore entitled to exemption from the antitrust laws. If, however, an
individual seeks an exercise of the police power for the purpose of under-
mining a competitor's position, he is no longer concerned with a proper
If the enactment is in a traditional police power area and if the legislature could have
had a proper objective in enacting it, the concomitant restraint may, from a legis-
lative standpoint, be valid, i.e., not subject to challenge on constitutional grounds and
therefore "reasonable." Viewed, however, as the product of activity by a private
party seeking to affect adversely the competitive position of another, the same re-
straint may be unreasonable within the standards developed under the doctrine and
may justify the imposition of antitrust sanctions.
37. Good motive is not a defense to a prosecution for acts in violation of the
antitrust laws. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912);
American Amusement Co. v. Ludwig, 82 F. Supp. 265, 267 (D. Minn. 1949).
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function of the state legislative process. Accordingly, the federal principle
does not demand the same protection from antitrust sanctions. Such a dis-
tinction on the basis of motive also accords with the relative danger to fed-
eral competitive policy in each of the two cases. Moreover, since the
reasons which preclude judicial investigation of the motives of a legislature
do not apply to an investigation of the motives of those who urge legisla-
tion,a s federal antitrust law could reach conduct directed toward ends
prohibited by it even though the validity of any state legislation that might
result from such conduct may not be challenged.
Privilege Under the First Amendment Guarantees of Freedom
of Speech and Petition
While principles of federalism may not preclude the application of anti-
trust sanctions to private action consciously seeking a restraint of competi-
tion through the enactment of state laws, the constitutional protection
which the first amendment accords to the process of invoking legislation
may do so. Rights protected by the first amendment are the basis of our
political democracy. 9 As Justice Brandeis stated, concurring in Whitney
v. California: 40
"Those who won our independence . . . believed that freedom
to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech
and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion
affords ordinarily adequate protection against dissemination of noxious
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that
public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a funda-
mental principle of the American government." 4
These rights are not absolute, but their great importance requires that they
be restricted only where necessary "to protect the State from destruction
or from serious injury, political, economic or moral." 42 If the antitrust
laws are applicable to private action by individuals or groups 43 urging the
enactment of state legislation, a serious restraint is placed on the exercise
of the first amendment freedoms of speech and petition. It is necessary,
then, to inquire into the principles determining when first amendment rights
38. Compare the lobbying acts of many states and the federal government, which
require professional lobbyists to register and file reports in order that the legislature
may better evaluate the propaganda directed toward it. See KEY, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 158-59; Comment, Improving the Legislative Process: Federal Regidation of
Lobbying, 56 YALE L.J. 304, 327-28 (1947).
39. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 592 (1952); De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551-
52 (1875).
40. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
41. 274 U.S. at 375.
42. Id. at 373. See also United Pub. Workers, CIO v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,
95 (1947) and cases cited n.30.
43. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 143-44 (1948).
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may be restricted. Due to limited case law on the right of petition, these
principles will be developed through analysis of the cases involving freedom
of speech and press. 44
Decisions dealing with the right of government to restrict or prohibit
freedom of speech and press are of two basic types: those in which there is
direct restriction of the exercise of the right and those in which there is
indirect restriction through regulation of particular conduct, deemed inimical
to the public welfare, with which the exercise of the right is associated.
45
While the problem of restriction is the same in both types of cases, the
difference in the situation which gives rise to it has led the Supreme Court
to a different approach in each.
Direct restrictions on these freedoms have been relatively limited in
nature. Chafee 40 has classified them as protection of individuals against
falsehood (e.g., libel, slander); protection of common standards of the
community (e.g., moral and religious standards by laws against obscenity
and blasphemy; social and political standards by teachers' oaths, anti-
evolution laws, compulsory flag salutes) ; security against internal violence
(e.g., sedition, contempt of court); and security against external aggres-
sion (e.g., treason, interference with a war effort). These restrictions,
particularly those intended to prevent internal violence and external agres-
sion, formed the context in which the "clear and present danger" test 
47
was developed. Viewed merely as a formula, such a test is of limited use-
fulness since it does not explain the constitutionality of restrictions of ex-
pression outside the political and economic sphere.48 Viewed as an attempt
to evaluate the essential considerations in judging restraints of speech and
press, the requirement of "dear and present danger" becomes more mean-
ingful. It seeks to protect the social value of free expression by permitting
its restriction only when there is strong evidence that the individual's words
will result in an immediate substantial evil.49 Basically, the test requires
determination of the seriousness of a threat to society, as measured by its
substantive nature and the probability of its occurrence, that will justify a
direct infringement of a constitutionally protected liberty. These con-
siderations are also the basis of decisions involving attempts to protect in-
44. On the problem of limitation of the first amendment rights of free speech
and press see generally, Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck to
Dennis, 52 COLUM. L. Rsv. 313 (1952); Comment, Current Limitations on Govern-
mental Invasion of First Amendment Freedoms, 13 OHio ST. L.J. 237 (1952).
45. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 502-11 (1951); American Communi-
cations Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 393-400 (1950).
46. 1 CHAs, GOVNMINT AND MASS COMUNICATIONs 61, 77-468 (1947).
47. The test was first employed by Justice Holmes in Schenwk v. United States:
"The question in every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
The early cases employing this test are cited in American Communications Ass'n
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 395 n.9 (1950).
48. 1 CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 46, at 52-53, 58.
49. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 395, 397 (1950).
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dividuals against falsehood 50 and attempts to protect community stand-
ards,51 though these cases do not employ the clear and present danger
test. 2
Cases involving restrictions on expression because of an attempt to
regulate other conduct cover a much broader range of activity. Again the
Court has had to decide how great a threat to society will be required to
justify a restriction of first amendment freedoms. But here, the threat
is not from the exercise of the right itself but from other conduct accom-
panying its exercise. Thus, it is the injury threatened by the conduct that
is balanced against the first amendment right in determining whether its
exercise may constitutionally be restrictedP In performing this task, the
Court has developed certain standards. When examining the evil, preven-
tion of which is the alleged justification of the restriction, it has looked
first to see that the legislation is not in fact aimed at the suppression of
unpopular ideas or is so broad or vague as to cover activities which are
clearly protected by the first amendment 5 4 A legitimate purpose being
found, the Court has looked to its substantive importance, as measured by
the nature of the harm sought to be prevented 51 and the probability of its
occurrence,5 6 to determine the magnitude of the threat to society posed by
the conduct. Against this is balanced the extent to which the constitu-
tionally protected right is infringed.5 7 The operation of this process has been
summarized by the Court as follows:
"In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,'
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech
as is necessary to avoid the danger. [This test] takes into considera-
tion those factors which we deem relevant, and relates their sig-
nificance." 5s
Although there are two distinct situations in which the problem of
restriction of first amendment rights arises, the principles which the Court
50. Compare Beauharnais v. People, 343 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1952) and cases cited,
with Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-19, 722 (1931).
51. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 504-05 (1952).
52. 1 CHAFEEr op. cit. supra note 46, at 54-58. The formulation of this test
in terms of the chronological proximity of the threatened evil makes it inap-
plicable to those situations where the utterance of the words themselves constitutes
the evil and to those where the evil does not bear a close temporal relationship to the
speech causing it (e.g., destruction of moral standards).
53. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 398-400 (1950) and
cases cited.
54. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 547 (1945) (concurring opinion);
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
55. For cases in which the interest sought to be protected was held to be too in-
substantial see, e.g., Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 276 (1951); Marsh v. Ala-
bama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) ; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
56. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 6 (1949); Giboney v. Empire
Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490, 503 (1949).
57. See, e.g., United Pub. Workers, CIO v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 99 (1947);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940).
58. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
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has followed in each suggest a common rationale. The fundamental im-
portance of freedom of speech and press to the democratic process requires
that the exercise of these rights be restricted only where it threatens a
substantial injury which the democratic process cannot prevent by its own
workings. Where the injury is threatened as a consequence of speech
itself, restraint is justified only when the speech of others cannot avert it.59
Where substantial injury is threatened as a consequence of conduct of which
speech is only a part, speech alone may not be able to avert the injury and
in this context restraint may be justified although such speech could not be
restrained by itself.60
Regardless of the particular conduct involved, the first amendment
presents a serious obstacle to the application of antitrust sanctions in the
area of private efforts to obtain enactment of state legislation restraining
competition. This obstacle seems greater, however, where the conduct has
consisted solely of an exercise of the rights of petition and free speech than
where it has also involved other acts directed toward the restraint of com-
petition. To extend the antitrust laws to conduct of the first type, even
though the rights of speech and petition were exercised pursuant to a con-
spiracy and from an improper motive, would constitute a direct restraint
on their exercise. It is doubtful that conduct limited to the exercise
of these rights threatens an injury to competition which the democratic
process cannot prevent by its own workings. Those who are opposed to
such legislation have an equal opportunity to exert their influence on the
legislature and to enlist what support they can arouse among the rest of the
electorate. It seems unlikely that legislation thus opposed would be enacted
without substantial support from persons not motivated by a desire to
restrain competition. Attaching civil and criminal penalties to the possible
results of this process would appear to be an unconstitutional interference
with first amendment rights.
Where there has been activity directed toward restraint of competi-
tion that involved more than the exercise of the first amendment freedoms,
there may exist a course of conduct which could be restrained despite the
concomitant restriction of the rights of speech and petition. This would
most clearly be true when the other acts consisted of such direct attempts
to restrain competition as, for example, price fixing. The democratic
process cannot prevent restraints imposed in this manner and the social
policy embodied in the antitrust laws is of sufficient importance to justify
the infringement of first amendment rights exercised in conjunction with
such activity. Speech is involved in every conspiracy, a fact that has never
been thought to prevent criminal punishment.61 That the right of peti-
59. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (concurring opin-
ion of Justice Brandeis); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 337-38 (1920) (dis-
senting opinion of Justice Brandeis).
60. Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498-503 (1949).
61. Id. at 502.
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tion has also been used in furtherance of a general effort to restrain com-
petition would not seem to alter this conclusion.
62
Where the accompanying course of conduct has been an attempt to
manipulate the legislative process, however, the right to treat such conduct
as separate from the exercise of first amendment freedoms becomes less
clear. The use of front organizations to circulate false and misleading
information to the public and to government officials and the creation of
apparently independent groups to give the illusion of additional support
for the legislation sought are examples.63
Perhaps such activity can be analogized to the abuse of administrative
or judicial processes, which has been recognized as a violation of the anti-
trust laws.6 In Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co.,O where defendant
had brought a patent infringement suit against plaintiff for purposes of
harassment, the court remarked:
"It is said that to allow recovery of damages resulting from the
infringement action would be a denial of free access to the courts..
At the same time we must not permit the courts to be a vehicle for
maintaining and carrying out an unlawful monopoly which has for its
purpose the elimination and prevention of competition." 66
If there has been "abuse of the legislative process" it might reasonably be
said that this is conduct designed to bring about a serious evil (restraint of
competition) which others, by the exercise of their rights of speech and
petition alone, may not be able to prevent. Since such conduct indicates
that those engaging in it seek to impose their desires on others without
regard for the democratic process and there is the possibility of serious
social injury through deception of the legislature, civil and criminal lia-
bility would seem to be consistent with the first amendment.
67
62. Cf. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
63. See, e.g., the allegations of the complaint in Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v.
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference, 113 F. Supp. 737, 741 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
64. See cases cited notes 2 & 3 supra. Contra, Okefenokee Rural Elec. Member-
ship Corp. v. Florida Power and Light Co., 214 F.2d 413 (1954).
65. 198 F2d 416 (10th Cir), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952).
66. 198 F.2d at 424.
67. It may be, however, that the more appropriate control for such abuses of
the legislative process lies in legislation specifically designed to protect it, the lobby-
ing acts. These acts, which exist in over half the states, require registration of lobby-
ists and, in general, the filing of financial reports. Kty, op. cit. supra note 7, at 158.
Their primary objective is to assure publicity of lobbying activities, on the theory
that this will enable the legislature to evaluate these pressures more accurately. Ksy,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 158. For purposes of antitrust enforcement, it would seem that
reliance on these acts, if they are effective, is preferable to the imposition of punitive
sanctions under the antitrust laws themselves. An enlightened legislature is probably
a greater safeguard against would-be antitrust violators who seek to "use" it than
any threat of possible civil and criminal prosecutions; and, in addition, costly litigation
is avoided. As lobbying legislation exists today, however, such reliance is unrealistic.
A large number of states have no such acts and, of those that do, many require only
"listless compliance." Key, op. cit. supra note 7, at 158. It seems doubtful that gen-
eral legislative enlightenment can be presumed under such circumstances. Thus, al-
though the imposition of antitrust penalties may be theoretically less effective, it has
the advantage of more widespread and vigorous enforcement which, in practice, should
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EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS IN PRIVATE ACTIONS To IMPOSE ANTITRUST
SANCTIONS ON LOBBYING ACTIVITY WITHIN THE SCOPE
OF THE ANTITRUST LAws
Certain special evidentiary problems affect the antitrust sanctions which
may be invoked by private individuals when lobbying activities of others
constitute the alleged violation. Section 7 of the Sherman Act as amended
by section 4 of the Clayton Act 68 grants a right of action for treble dam-
ages, attorney's fees and costs of suit to "any person who shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-
trust laws." Section 16 of the Clayton Act 69 grants the right to injunctive
relief "against threatened [conduct that will cause] loss or damage by a
violation of the antitrust laws." To maintain the action for treble damages,
it is necessary for the plaintiff to establish three things: that the defendant
has violated the antitrust laws; that the acts constituting this violation have
caused damage to him; and the amount of these damages.70
Assuming that defendant's ends in seeking state legislation constitute
a violation of the antitrust laws, establishment of the causal connection be-
tween defendant's activity and the passage of the legislation poses unique
difficulties because of the doctrine that courts may not inquire into motives
of the legislature. This principle, which created difficulty on the con-
stitutional plane in determining the extent to which private action to induce
state legislative restraints of trade could be brought within the scope of the
Sherman Act, again becomes important on a practical level when other
individuals seek to impose the sanctions of the antitrust laws on such
conduct."1
The decisions which establish the immunity from judicial inquiry of
legislative motives were concerned either with attempts to invalidate legis-
lation on the basis of the motives which lead to its passage 72 or attempts
to hold legislators personally liable for their conduct in the performance
of their duties.7 3 Thus the interests sought to be protected by the rule
would seem to be first, the general constitutional right of the legislative
make it the more effective remedy. Although control of lobbying activities is basically
a matter of state concern, federally created sanctions may properly be imposed in the
antitrust area, since this problem is one of national significance. If congressional pol-
icy is to be served, the control of private attempts to secure legislative restraints of
trade appears to require the imposition of antitrust sanctions where appropriate. Any
beneficial effects of lobbying legislation would be supplementary and in no way les-
sened.
68. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952).
69. 38 STAT. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1952).
70. Greenleaf v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 79 F. Supp. 362, 364 (E.D. Pa.
1947). See also Turner Glass Corp. v. Hartford Empire Co., 173 F.2d 49, 51-52 (7th
Cir. 1949); Suckow Borax Mines Consolidated, Inc. v. Borax Consolidated, Ltd., 81
F. Supp. 301, 305 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
71. The problem does not exist when relief is sought by the federal government
since it is unnecessary for it to prove that defendant's activities succeeded in restrain-
ing competition. Only the attempt to do so need be shown.
72. See cases cited notes 24-26 supra.
73. See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1951).
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branch to operate freely within its sphere of power and, second, the freedom
of individual legislators to perform their duties without fear of civil or
criminal liability. The interest in protecting legislators in the discharge of
their duties seems to require that they not be burdened by inquiries into
their motives, even though the matter does not involve any personal lia-
bility. This would not preclude an attempt to prove by circumstantial
evidence the factors that influenced their actions, nor would such an attempt
violate the principle of separation of powers. However, it is questionable
whether circumstantial evidence alone would be adequate.
The standard of proof for causation in treble damage suits, as stated in
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,74 is that
".. . in the absence of more precise proof, the jury could conclude
as a matter of just and reasonable inference from the proof of defend-
ants' wrongful acts and their tendency to injure plaintiffs' business,
and from the evidence of the decline in prices, profits and values, not
shown to be attributable to other causes, that defendants' wrongful acts
had caused damage to the plaintiffs." (Emphasis added.) 75
Where the basis of the action is defendant's unlawful activity leading to the
enactment of injurious state legislation, it would appear almost impossible
to prove by circumstantial evidence that such legislation was not attributable
to other causes. Equally difficult is the case where defendant's activity
has been directed toward the defeat of a bill favorable to plaintiff's com-
petitive position. A controversial bill produces many pressures on the
legislature, a number of which may be influential in determining each
legislator's vote. Even under the more liberal standard of causation
suggested in Momand v. Universal Film Exchange, Inc.," "a more sub-
stantial cause of loss than any other known cause," or the standard of
general tort law, "a material element and a substantial factor" in bringing
about the event,77 proof would be very difficult. Although it might be
shown that defendant's conduct constituted the greatest single influence
brought to bear on the legislature, there is always the possibility that it
discounted this pressure and would have enacted the legislation, for other
reasons, without it.78 Only where a bill favorable to plaintiff has been
74. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
75. Id. at 264.
76. 72 F. Supp. 469, 480 (D. Mass. 1947).
77. Psossma, ToRTs § 44 (2d ed. 1955).
78. If the plaintiff is able to prove that defendant's acts have been the cause of
injury to him, the courts are liberal in admitting evidence to establish the amount of
his damages. Where the amount cannot be fixed with certainty, damages may still be
recovered on "probable and inferential, as well as direct and positive proof." Bigelow
v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946). Indeed, under the holding
of the Bigelow case, supra, it would appear that if the plaintiff has proved that de-
fendant's acts were the cause of his injury he has also satisfactorily proved the amount
of his damages. See Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Dam-
ages in Private Antitrust Suits, 52 MicHa. L. Riv. 363, 374-75 (1954); McConnell,
The Treble Damage Action, U. ILL. L. FORUM 659, 668 (1950); Note, 64 HAv. L.
Riv. 317, 318 (1950).
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passed by the legislature but vetoed by the governor would it appear pos-
sible to establish defendant's responsibility for the restraint; and although
the state of mind of only one man is involved, the task of proof remains a
difficult one because of the necessity of relying on circumstantial evidence.
While it may be impossible to prove damage from defendant's conduct,
it may still be possible to get an injunction to protect against prospective
injury from future repetition of such conduct.7 9 "The mere cessation of an
unlawful activity before suit does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to
provide against its resumption . . . (unless it apears) that there is no
reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated." 80 In addition,
the court may allow costs if both an injunction and damages were sought
but damages were not recovered.8'
CONCLUSION
The basic problem presented by application of antitrust sanctions to
private conduct seeking to restrain competition through state legislative
action results from a conflict between the role of government in regulating
individual and group conduct for the general welfare and its role in
providing social unity through reconciliation of varied individual and group
interests freely expressed under the protection of the first amendment. It
is believed that the language of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act is
sufficiently broad to encompass lobbying activities and that the problem
therefore becomes one of determining the limitations upon congressional
power imposed by the principle of federalism and the first amendment.
Although doctrinally the language of the Sherman Act permits of no dis-
tinction on the basis of motive, it would appear that the principle of
federalism requires that those individuals seeking exercises of the states'
police power for reasons properly the concern of the states should be held
immune from antitrust sanctions.8 In the case of those seeking a state
enactment for the purpose of restraining trade, the first amendment may
provide a shield, at least in those cases in which the lobbyist's activity is
not accompanied by other conduct inimical to the interests of society.
However, where the inducement of state legislative activity is merely part
of a larger conspiracy to restrain trade or where the lobbyist resorts to
measures designed to deceive or corrupt the legislature, first amendment
protection may be withdrawn thereby exposing the lobbyist to the far
79. Mid-West Theatres Co. v. Co-operative Theatres, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 216, 224
(E.D. Mich. 1941) ; Ring v. Spina, 84 F. Supp. 403, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) ; cf. Georgia
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
80. United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 448 (2d Cir. 1945); United
States v. Insurance Bd., 144 F. Supp. 684, 691 (N.D.'Ohio 1956) and cases cited
therein.
81. Ring v. Spina, 84 F. Supp. 403, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
82. The recent decision in Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern Railroad Presi-
dents Conference, Civil No. 14715, ED. Pa., Oct. 10, 1957, supports this conclusion.
In its discussion of the defenses raised to plaintiffs' action, the court states: ". . . it is
not a mere legislatively-created monopoly that is under attack in this case. It is a
conspiracy to destroy a competitor . . . as well as the fomentation of government
restrictions."
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reaching provisions of the Sherman Act.83 Although an individual's con-
duct may have contravened the prohibitions of the Sherman Act, practical
evidentiary problems may make difficult the prosecution of a treble damage
action. Establishing a causal connection between the defendant's attempts
to secure legislation and passage of that legislation poses peculiar problems
because of the judicial policy against inquiring into the motives of par-
ticular legislators. However, there appears to be no reason why injunctive
relief may not be available in appropriate cases.
P.H.O.
83. See Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference,
supra note 82, where the court concludes: "... the defendants' conduct is not within
that broad expanse of conduct which is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. What the defendants have combined to do is something more than free speech;
something more than freedom to assemble; something more than a petition to the
legislature."
